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Practical email workflow guide · By Yes AI

How to check bank detail change requests by email

Published 5 min read

Payment redirection scams work because the email looks routine. It can come from a supplier's real address, inside an existing thread, with an invoice that matches earlier ones in everything except the account number. An AI email tool reading that thread cannot tell it is fake, so the controls have to sit in your process.

Quick answer

Never change bank details on the strength of an email. Route any message that mentions new payment details to a restricted queue, hold related payments, and phone the supplier or employee on a number from your own records, never one in the email. Record who confirmed the change and when, and have a second person approve the update. AI tools can flag these emails but should never edit details or reply to confirm them.

Finance officer in a Sydney office phoning a supplier to confirm payment details while reading an email on screen

How do payment redirection scams arrive?

Scamwatch describes fake invoices that come from a business's real email address, because scammers have accessed its systems, or from an address that has changed slightly. The fake invoice can carry the real logo and ABN and sit in the same conversation history as genuine emails. If you reply to ask about the new details, the scammer answers and explains the change. The ACSC's guidance on business email compromise describes the same pattern: criminals compromise a vendor's email account, edit the bank details on legitimate invoices and send them to customers, who pay the criminals thinking they are paying the vendor.

Which emails should trigger the verification process?

Set the trigger wide, because the warning signs look ordinary. The ACSC's list includes an unexpected change of bank details, an urgent payment request or threats of serious consequences, unusual payment requests from someone in authority, and an email address that does not quite match the supplier's name. Payroll is a second target. The ACSC describes criminals impersonating a staff member to request a change to that person's banking details, so the salary goes to their account. Treat any of the messages below as a verification case, whoever appears to send it.

  • Any mention of new or updated bank, BSB or account details.
  • An invoice whose payment details differ from the last one from that supplier.
  • A staff member asking to change the account their pay goes to.
  • Urgency or secrecy around a payment.
  • A sender domain that differs from the usual one by a letter or a suffix.

What should the verification step involve?

Phone the supplier using a number you already hold, or one taken from their official website, never a number in the email or on the attached invoice. The ACSC recommends contacting the sender separately using contact details you have verified yourself. Speak to someone you have dealt with before where possible and ask them to read the new details back to you. Record the date, the person you spoke to, the number you called and what they confirmed. A second staff member then makes the change in your accounting system, so one compromised mailbox or one rushed person cannot redirect money alone.

Why can't AI verify these emails?

An AI model judges an email by its content and context. A message from a compromised supplier account has the right sender, the right thread history and believable wording, which are the signals a model relies on. The model cannot phone anyone or confirm that the person behind the mailbox is who they appear to be. If it replies in the thread to confirm the change, the reply goes to the scammer, and Scamwatch notes the scammer will answer with an explanation. Configure your email tools so payment-detail messages are labelled and routed, with drafting and sending switched off for that category.

What happens to payments while a change is checked?

Hold any payment to that supplier until verification is complete, and tell the person approving the pay run why it is held. If the call shows the request was fake, the supplier's own mailbox may be compromised, so tell them by phone as well. Keep the email as evidence instead of deleting it. If money has already been paid to the new account, contact your bank straight away and report the incident through the Australian Cyber Security Centre at cyber.gov.au. Then check which of your own accounts and mailboxes were involved.

How do you stop your own mailbox being used?

Criminals also use compromised business mailboxes to send fake invoices to that business's customers. The ACSC recommends multi-factor authentication for business email and systems, and describes it as one of the most effective controls against unauthorised access. Publish SPF, DKIM and DMARC records for your domain so receiving servers can recognise forged mail. Tell your customers in writing that your bank details will not change by email, and give them a number to call if they ever receive a request that says otherwise.

Who does what when bank details change

StepWhoEvidence keptAI tool role
Flag the emailInbox triageOriginal email kept uneditedLabel and route; no draft
Hold paymentsAccounts payable officerNote on the supplier recordNone
Call to verifyAccounts payable officerDate, contact name and the number calledNone
Approve the changeA second staff memberApproval recordNone
Update the systemApprover or delegateChange log in the accounting softwareNone
Confirm with the supplierAccounts payable officerCall or letter to the known contactMay draft a confirmation to the known contact for a person to approve

Practical checklist

  • Payment-detail emails have their own label and route to a restricted queue.
  • Drafting and sending are switched off for that category in every email tool.
  • Verification numbers come from your records or the supplier's official website.
  • Each change records who confirmed it, when, and which number was called.
  • A second person approves every bank detail change.
  • Payroll bank detail changes follow the same process.
  • Multi-factor authentication is on for every mailbox that handles payments.

Common questions

What if the supplier insists we use the new account urgently?

Urgency is one of the warning signs the ACSC lists. Explain that your process requires a phone check before any change, and hold the payment until it is done. A genuine supplier will accept a short delay. Do not let a deadline written in the email shorten the process.

Is replying to the email a reasonable way to check?

No. Scamwatch says that if you reply to ask about the payment details, the scammer will respond and explain the change, because they control the mailbox or the lookalike address. Use a phone number you already hold or one from the supplier's official website, and speak to a person.

Should we tell customers our bank details will never change by email?

Yes. It helps them catch fakes that use your name. Put the statement on invoices and in your onboarding documents, and give a phone number to call if they receive a change request. Scamwatch advises people to check payment details directly with a business before paying an emailed invoice.

Can an AI tool compare bank details on each invoice with the last one?

Yes, and it is a useful check. An extraction step can read the BSB and account number on each invoice and flag any difference from the supplier record. The flag should send the bill to verification and hold it there. The tool should never update the stored bank details itself.

What should we do if we have already paid a fake account?

Call your bank immediately and ask what it can do to recover the payment, then report the incident through cyber.gov.au. Tell the genuine supplier, since their mailbox may be compromised, and keep the emails as evidence. Review which of your own accounts and mailboxes were involved and reset their passwords and sign-in methods.

Sources and further reading

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